Abstract-In this paper, a chaos-based cryptosystem using sampled chaos signals with frequency-domain aliasing is proposed. In this scheme, a higher degree of randomness of the running-key sequence is obtained, and an additional random seed consisting of the sampling frequency as the parameter is introduced. This leads to an enhancement of the cryptosystem security. Numerical and simulation results of a Lorenz cryptosystem are given to demonstrate the performance and effectiveness of the proposed approach.
I. INTRODUCTION

C
HAOTIC systems have deterministic dynamics and are characterized by high sensitivity to initial conditions, random-like behavior and broadband power spectrum. Local trajectories of a deterministic chaotic system can oscillate strongly and diverge exponentially yielding long term unpredictable chaotic behavior. Recently, the possibility of synchronization between chaotic systems with identical parameters but different initial conditions, i.e., tracking and reproduction of deterministic but highly unpredictable chaotic signals, have motivated many research interests in using chaotic signals and systems for practical applications [1] - [11] . These applications include spread-spectrum communications, secure communications, and information processing [6] - [13] .
Possible connections and applications of chaos to cryptosystem are reported in a recent survey paper [14] and applications of chaotic signals to the design of cryptosystems can be found in [8] - [12] . A chaotic cryptosystem is essentially a stream cipher system, where parameters of the chaotic system can play the role of random seeds and the sequence of binary variables generated from the chaotic dynamics is the running-key sequence. The randomness of the running-key sequence is very important for security of such chaos-based cryptosystems.
The security aspects of chaos-based cryptosystems have been studied in a number of works. In [15] - [17] , it was shown that unmasking of some chaos-based secure communication systems is possible by modeling and predicting the transmitter. Recently, Manuscript [18] analyzed the receiver parameters of chaos-based cryptosystems which used chaotic synchronization. It is shown that the cryptosystem security is vulnerable under some attacks when the dynamic model of the chaos system is known.
In this paper, we propose a new approach to the design of chaos-based cryptosystems which uses frequency-domain aliasing for improving randomness of the running-key sequence and security of the key seeds. The frequency-domain aliasing is obtained through sampling of the chaotic signal with a sampling frequency which is within the bandwidth of the chaotic signal. The frequency spectrum of the sampled discrete-time sequence is flatter and, therefore, whiter leading to enriched randomness. Moreover, the running-key sequence provided by the sampled chaotic signal is highly sensitive to the sampling frequency. The randomness of the running-key sequence and the nonanalytical nature of the sampling frequency can considerably enhance the cryptosystem security. The randomness of the running-key sequence and its sensitivity to the sampling frequency are quantitatively evaluated by the correlation functions.
The rest of this paper is as organized as follows. In Section II, the sampling scheme of the chaotic signal is presented. Section III presents the chaos-based cryptosystem and numerical results are shown for illustrating the efficiency of the proposed scheme. Finally, some concluding remarks are given in Section IV.
II. SAMPLING CHAOTIC SIGNALS
A. Aliasing in the Frequency Domain
The sampling theorem has been well known in signals and systems. It provides a condition under which a band limited continuous-time signal can be completely represented by and reconstructed from its discrete time samples. If replicas of which is no longer replicated in the spectrum of sampled signal . In the case that the sampling frequency is considerably under sampled, then the contiguous shifted replicas of overlap, which can yield a roughly "flat" spectrum of . Such a frequency-domain aliasing effect is shown in Fig. 1 .
It is known that white noise is characterized by its uniformly distributed frequency spectrum over the whole frequency band. In the time domain, its correlation function is an impulse response. When a chaotic signal is sampled with a frequency below its bandwidth, the frequency spectrum of its sampled discrete time sequence can be flatten due to the frequency-domain aliasing. In this sense, the sampled chaotic sequence is whiten and its randomness is improved.
B. Sampling Chaotic Signals
A chaos-based cryptosystem is essentially a stream cipher system. In stream cipher cryptography, the critical problem is to efficiently generate a long running-key sequence from short and random keys [14] , [19] , [20] which are also called key seeds. In a chaos-based cryptosystem, the parameters and initial conditions of the chaos systems play the role as random seeds and the state variables of the system generated from the chaotic dynamics are the running-key sequences. Since the behavior of chaotic systems are sensitive to initial conditions as well as parameter variations, the parameter space of some chaotic system is large enough for the random key seeds. The running-key sequence can be recovered from the receiver side by synchronization of the chaotic systems. It is desirable that the running-key sequence has high degree of randomness for obtaining high degree of the cryptosystem security.
It has been known that the power spectrum of some continuous time chaotic signals decays exponentially in the high frequency band [21] . On the other hand, a white noise signal is known to have a "flat" power spectrum and an impulse function as its autocorrelation. Thus, in order to have a high degree of randomness, we would like the running-key sequence to have a white noise like power spectrum and autocorrelation.
To improve randomness of the running-key sequence, we introduce a sampling scheme for the continuous time chaotic signal, whose sampling frequency is considerably below the bandwidth of the chaotic signal. Since the spectrum of the sampled discrete-time sequence can be flatten due to the frequency-domain aliasing, its degree of randomness can be increased by slowing down the sampling frequency. Thus we can use the sampled discrete time sequence as the running-key sequence and the sampling frequency together with the chaotic system parameters as the key seeds.
The sampled running-key sequence is a sampled discrete data sequence which is combined with the plaintext to form the ciphertext sequence and transmitted through the communication channel to the receiver system. Therefore, the transmission channel operates in discrete time only. It is noted that the transmission rate of the communication channel is determined by the channel capacity and operational conditions so is independent of the original sampling rate for obtaining the running-key sequence from the chaotic system. Hence, there is no information about the original sampling rate of the running-key sequence contained in the encrypted data sequence transmitted through the communication channel.
The above analysis enables us to state several reasons why the use of sampled chaotic sequence with aliasing in the frequency-domain can greatly strengthen secure protection of the cryptosystem from attacks. First, the sampled running-key sequence is highly sensitive to the sampling frequency that has a nonanalytical nature. This can greatly improve the security of the key seeds when the sampling frequency is included in the key seeds. Next, frequency aliasing makes it impossible to reconstruct the original continuous time chaotic signal from the running-key sequence. Finally, the running-key sequence with aliasing in the frequency domain provides little information for directly estimating the parameters of the continuous time chaotic systems. In contrast, in the case where only the continuous time chaotic signal is used, a recent work showed that the cryptosystem security is vulnerable under some attack [18] .
We will use correlation functions for quantitative evaluation of the randomness of the running-key sequence and its sensitivity to variation of the sampling frequency. For two discrete time real sequences and of length , their cross-correlation is It becomes the autocorrelation of the sequence if .
III. CHAOS-BASED CRYPTOSYSTEM
A. Structure of Chaos-Based Cryptosystem
The structure of the proposed chaos-based cryptosystem with aliasing in the frequency domain is shown in Fig. 2 . The proposed scheme is essentially a stream cipher system with the random signal replaced by a chaotic signal generated by a chaotic system. The cryptosystem consists of two main parts: encrypter and decrypter. The encrypter consists of a continuous time chaotic system, a sampler and an encryption algorithm. The encryption algorithm combines the plaintext and the running-key sequence to generate the ciphertext . The decrypter has an identical chaotic system, a corresponding sampler, a decryption algorithm and a synchronization controller. The composition block is used to combine the ciphertext and synchronization drive pulses in a time frame, which is transmitted through the public channel to the receiver. In the receiver, they are separated in the decomposition block. The sampler of the receiver samples the continuous-time chaotic signal to provide the running-key sequence with the frequency-domain aliasing. The key seeds of the cryptosystem are parameters of the chaotic system and the sampling frequency of the sampler.
Since the chaotic system has deterministic characteristics, it is possible to synchronize its performance. The function of the synchronization controller is to synchronize the two chaotic systems embedded in the encrypter and decrypter. The ciphertext and synchronization driving impulses are transmitted to the decrypter. When the two chaotic systems are synchronized, the decrypter recovers the running-key sequence as that generated in the encrypter.
We propose to use the impulsive control scheme [8] for the synchronization. This scheme has a large bound of impulsive intervals and requires less bandwidth for the transmission of synchronization impulses. Thus, it has advantage of more efficient utilization of the channel bandwidth. Another advantage of this synchronization scheme is that it can provide fast convergence and guaranteed synchronization accuracy.
It is noted that the ciphertext, the synchronization impulses, and the random keys are all discrete data and transmitted through the digital transmission channel. There is no analog signal involved in the data transmission.
B. Lorenz System and Synchronization
We consider using the well-known Lorenz system for the proposed cryptosystem. Its model for the driving chaotic system in the encrypter is written as (1) where is the three-dimensional (3-D) state vector and , , and are three real positive parameters of the system. The driven chaotic system in the decrypter has identical dynamics as (1) . Let be the 3-D state vector of the driven system. We follow the impulsive synchronization scheme in [8] to write the driven chaotic system and the impulsive synchronizer as (2) where , is the synchronization error, are time instants satisfying with being a given positive constant, and is a 3 3 matrix to be designed such that the greatest eigenvalue of is less than 1. A key step in the design of the impulsive synchronizer is the selection of impulsive interval bounds. Introduce bounds on the impulsive input intervals as (3) We further introduce the following function: (4) where and are positive parameters to be chosen following the specifications in [8] , in which we can see that the synchronization error can be controlled to be less than a specified error tolerance , and is the upper bound of the states and . Let denote the largest eigenvalue of matrix . It can be shown that . One can readily determine and such that . Then, the driving and driven Lorenz systems can be synchronized if the following inequality condition is satisfied: (5) where is a parameter, is the greatest eigenvalue of , and . Therefore, we can choose the impulsive interval bound as (6)
C. Encryption and Decryption Algorithms
The encrypter algorithm is given as (7) (8) where denotes the integer truncation of , denotes the XOR operation, is the plaintext, is the running-key and represents the ciphertext. The running-key sequence is the scaled and quantized which is the sampled chaotic variable of the Lorenz system. It can be known from (8) that if and , where ; then, the error between the sender and the receiver cannot be observed. Therefore, the design of the scale value is related to the asymptotic stable time of the chaotic system and the desired precision of the system. A larger scale value will produce a more secure system but at the expense of more synchronization time. Thus, in practice, a tradeoff is required when choose the scale value. The plaintext is in standard ASCII 128 code format and transmitted to the receiver together with the synchronization impulses.
While the synchronization is achieved between the two Lorenz systems in the encrypter and decrypter, the running-key , which is same as , is reproduced in the decrypter. Then, the plaintext can be recovered by using the following decrypter algorithm:
where is the sampled sequence of the synchronized chaotic signal .
IV. NUMERICAL EVALUATION AND SIMULATION
A. Randomness of Sampled Chaotic Signals
Consider that the parameters of the Lorenz system are: , , , and an initial condition . The continuous-time Lorenz systems in the encrypter and decrypter are numerically integrated by fourthorder Runge-Kutta method with fixed step size of . To demonstrate the improvement of randomness of chaotic signals by frequency-domain aliasing, we sample the continuous time chaotic signal with different sampling periods 0.008, 0.08, 0.4, and 0.8 s, respectively, for a time interval. It turns out that, as the sampling frequency becomes slower, the frequency spectrum of the sampled signal becomes flatter, which implies that the sampled signal becomes more white noise like and random. This effect is due to the aliasing in the frequency domain and is demonstrated in Fig. 3 in the unitized frequency domain for the four different sampling periods.
Further evaluation of the randomness of the sampled signal is also carried out by using the autocorrelation function. The autocorrelations of the continuous chaotic signal and its sampled signal with sampling period 0.4 s for 25 000 samples are computed. The autocorrelations of the continuous time and that of the sampled are plotted in Fig. 4(a) and (b) , respectively. It is shown that the autocorrelation of the sampled signal is more impulse function like. This is due to aliasing in the frequency domain which improves the degree of randomness of the sampled signal.
B. Sensitivity to Sampling Frequency
The sampling scheme for the cryptosystem introduces the sampling frequency as a variable in the key seeds. For the security of the cryptosystem, it is desirable that the running-key sequence is highly sensitive to the sampling frequency as a variable in the key seeds. Our evaluation shows that a small variation of the sampling frequency can lead to significant changes in the sampled chaotic signals. This is not only because of the chaotic behavior of the original continuous signal, but also due to the accumulated time shifts between the sampled data with different sampling frequencies.
The correlation coefficient is a measure of the dependence between two variable sequences. For two sequences and , introduce their correlation coefficient as (11) where (12) is the covariance of and and denotes the mathematical expectation. The value of the correlation coefficient is between 1 and 1, with representing the strongest correlation between and and indicating no relationship between and .
To evaluate the sensitivity of the running-key sequence to the sampling frequency, consider that the sampling period varies about 0.4 s and let variation of the sampling period be . We computed a number correlation coefficients between the two running-key sequences with the sampling periods s and s, respectively. This correlation coefficient is a function of and can be denoted by . A plot of is shown in Fig. 5 which demonstrates that the running-key sequence is highly sensitive to the variation of the sampling period.
C. Simulation of the Cryptosystem
In the simulation study of the cryptosystem, the impulsive control matrix of the synchronizer is chosen as and . It is easy to show that , , , . Choose , the upper bound of the impulsive interval is . For the synchronization error tolerance , we set the impulsive intervals in the simulation as , . The chaotic system in the receiver is synchronized with that in the receiver after 7.5 ms [8] .
The running-key sequence is the sampled variable of the Lorenz system, as discussed in the previous sections. The sample period is 0.4 s to produce the sampled random key sequence. The obtained running-key sequence is shown in Fig. 6 (a) and the transmitted ciphertext is shown in Fig. 6(b) . The ciphertext and the original plaintext are given below and the recovered text is exactly the same as the original one. The standard ASCII characters include letter, number, and punctuation symbol. And it can be seen that the ciphertext spread all over the codes. 
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a sampling scheme with frequency-domain aliasing for chaos-based cryptosystems. It is to produce a random running-key sequence for encryption with high degree of randomness to enhance the security of the cryptosystem. The desirable randomness and security are evaluated and demonstrated by correlations of the sampled running-key sequences. The sensitivity of the running key sequence to the sampling frequency is also evaluated and demonstrated. An application example in text file encryption using the proposed sampled cryptosystem is presented.
